[ros-diffs] [reactos] 01/02: [NTOS:SE] Implement SeTokenCanImpersonate routine

[George Bișoc]

https://git.reactos.org/?p=reactos.git;a=commitdiff;h=18ddb6ba9248f1812b182…

commit 18ddb6ba9248f1812b182277d28d6e86707cb91f
Author:     George Bișoc <george.bisoc(a)reactos.org>
AuthorDate: Mon Apr 12 14:33:42 2021 +0200
Commit:     George Bișoc <george.bisoc(a)reactos.org>
CommitDate: Sun May 2 16:55:19 2021 +0200

    [NTOS:SE] Implement SeTokenCanImpersonate routine
    
    SeTokenCanImpersonate ensures whether the client impersonation can occur, and if not,
the call signals this to the caller.
---
 ntoskrnl/include/internal/se.h |  7 +++
 ntoskrnl/se/token.c            | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 105 insertions(+)

diff --git a/ntoskrnl/include/internal/se.h b/ntoskrnl/include/internal/se.h
index 727060af822..0a8561d397a 100644
--- a/ntoskrnl/include/internal/se.h
+++ b/ntoskrnl/include/internal/se.h
@@ -248,6 +248,13 @@ SepSidInTokenEx(
     IN BOOLEAN Restricted
 );
 
+BOOLEAN
+NTAPI
+SeTokenCanImpersonate(
+    _In_ PTOKEN ProcessToken,
+    _In_ PTOKEN TokenToImpersonate,
+    _In_ SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL ImpersonationLevel);
+
 /* Functions */
 BOOLEAN
 NTAPI
diff --git a/ntoskrnl/se/token.c b/ntoskrnl/se/token.c
index 1849a16c3a7..32842ebce99 100644
--- a/ntoskrnl/se/token.c
+++ b/ntoskrnl/se/token.c
@@ -2265,6 +2265,104 @@ SeTokenIsWriteRestricted(IN PACCESS_TOKEN Token)
     return (((PTOKEN)Token)->TokenFlags & SE_BACKUP_PRIVILEGES_CHECKED) != 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * @brief
+ * Ensures that client impersonation can occur by checking if the token
+ * we're going to assign as the impersonation token can be actually impersonated
+ * in the first place. The routine is used primarily by PsImpersonateClient.
+ *
+ * @param[in] ProcessToken
+ * Token from a process.
+ *
+ * @param[in] TokenToImpersonate
+ * Token that we are going to impersonate.
+ *
+ * @param[in] ImpersonationLevel
+ * Security impersonation level grade.
+ *
+ * @return
+ * Returns TRUE if the conditions checked are met for token impersonation,
+ * FALSE otherwise.
+ */
+BOOLEAN
+NTAPI
+SeTokenCanImpersonate(
+    _In_ PTOKEN ProcessToken,
+    _In_ PTOKEN TokenToImpersonate,
+    _In_ SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL ImpersonationLevel)
+{
+    BOOLEAN CanImpersonate;
+    PAGED_CODE();
+
+    /*
+     * SecurityAnonymous and SecurityIdentification levels do not
+     * allow impersonation. If we get such levels from the call
+     * then something's seriously wrong.
+     */
+    ASSERT(ImpersonationLevel != SecurityAnonymous ||
+           ImpersonationLevel != SecurityIdentification);
+
+    /* Time to lock our tokens */
+    SepAcquireTokenLockShared(ProcessToken);
+    SepAcquireTokenLockShared(TokenToImpersonate);
+
+    /* What kind of authentication ID does the token have? */
+    if (RtlEqualLuid(&TokenToImpersonate->AuthenticationId,
+                     &SeAnonymousAuthenticationId))
+    {
+        /*
+         * OK, it looks like the token has an anonymous
+         * authentication. Is that token created by the system?
+         */
+        if (TokenToImpersonate->TokenSource.SourceName !=
SeSystemTokenSource.SourceName &&
+            !RtlEqualLuid(&TokenToImpersonate->TokenSource.SourceIdentifier,
&SeSystemTokenSource.SourceIdentifier))
+        {
+            /* It isn't, we can't impersonate regular tokens */
+            DPRINT("SeTokenCanImpersonate(): Token has an anonymous authentication
ID, can't impersonate!\n");
+            CanImpersonate = FALSE;
+            goto Quit;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Are the SID values from both tokens equal? */
+    if (!RtlEqualSid(ProcessToken->UserAndGroups->Sid,
+                     TokenToImpersonate->UserAndGroups->Sid))
+    {
+        /* They aren't, bail out */
+        DPRINT("SeTokenCanImpersonate(): Tokens SIDs are not equal!\n");
+        CanImpersonate = FALSE;
+        goto Quit;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Make sure the tokens aren't diverged in terms of
+     * restrictions, that is, one token is restricted
+     * but the other one isn't.
+     */
+    if (SeTokenIsRestricted(ProcessToken) !=
+        SeTokenIsRestricted(TokenToImpersonate))
+    {
+        /*
+         * One token is restricted so we cannot
+         * continue further at this point, bail out.
+         */
+        DPRINT("SeTokenCanImpersonate(): One token is restricted, can't
continue!\n");
+        CanImpersonate = FALSE;
+        goto Quit;
+    }
+
+    /* If we've reached that far then we can impersonate! */
+    DPRINT("SeTokenCanImpersonate(): We can impersonate.\n");
+    CanImpersonate = TRUE;
+
+Quit:
+    /* We're done, unlock the tokens now */
+    SepReleaseTokenLock(ProcessToken);
+    SepReleaseTokenLock(TokenToImpersonate);
+
+    return CanImpersonate;
+}
+
 /* SYSTEM CALLS ***************************************************************/
 
 /*