20 Oct
2019
20 Oct
'19
10:48 a.m.
https://git.reactos.org/?p=reactos.git;a=commitdiff;h=c1eccaffaa113e63b3729…
commit c1eccaffaa113e63b3729b03886375c8861e4452
Author: Thomas Faber <thomas.faber(a)reactos.org>
AuthorDate: Sun Oct 20 12:44:34 2019 +0200
Commit: Thomas Faber <thomas.faber(a)reactos.org>
CommitDate: Sun Oct 20 12:46:35 2019 +0200
[MBEDTLS] Update to version 2.7.12. CORE-16440
---
dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/bignum.c | 3 +-
dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/certs.c | 63 ++++++------
dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecdsa.c | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++----
dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecjpake.c | 4 +-
dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp.c | 34 ++++---
dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/error.c | 2 +-
dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/havege.c | 30 ++++--
dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.c | 86 ++++++++++++-----
dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/net_sockets.c | 2 +-
dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/pkwrite.c | 33 ++++++-
dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_srv.c | 2 +-
dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_tls.c | 6 +-
dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/timing.c | 1 -
dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509.c | 2 +-
dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509write_crt.c | 12 ++-
dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509write_csr.c | 12 ++-
media/doc/3rd Party Files.txt | 2 +-
sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/check_config.h | 7 +-
sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/config.h | 22 +++--
sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecdsa.h | 67 ++++++++++++-
sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecp.h | 16 +++
sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h | 2 +-
sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/pk.h | 4 +
sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/rsa.h | 9 +-
sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl.h | 4 +-
sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h | 4 +-
sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/version.h | 8 +-
sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509.h | 6 +-
sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509_crl.h | 4 +-
29 files changed, 434 insertions(+), 136 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/bignum.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/bignum.c
index a7e3e5f791b..62314c5bcd5 100644
--- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/bignum.c
+++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/bignum.c
@@ -2140,7 +2140,8 @@ static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t rounds,
}
if (count++ > 30) {
- return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE;
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE;
+ goto cleanup;
}
} while ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) >= 0 ||
diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/certs.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/certs.c
index b143db4a46e..78076f9f397 100644
--- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/certs.c
+++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/certs.c
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len = sizeof(
mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa );
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \
"MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \
"MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \
-"MTEwMjEyMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjEwMjEyMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \
+"MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \
"A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n" \
"AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN\r\n" \
"owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz\r\n" \
@@ -195,13 +195,13 @@ const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len = sizeof(
mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa );
"hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya\r\n" \
"HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYD\r\n" \
"VR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgw\r\n" \
-"FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAGGEshT5\r\n" \
-"kvnRmLVScVeUEdwIrvW7ezbGbUvJ8VxeJ79/HSjlLiGbMc4uUathwtzEdi9R/4C5\r\n" \
-"DXBNeEPTkbB+fhG1W06iHYj/Dp8+aaG7fuDxKVKHVZSqBnmQLn73ymyclZNHii5A\r\n" \
-"3nTS8WUaHAzxN/rajOtoM7aH1P9tULpHrl+7HOeLMpxUnwI12ZqZaLIzxbcdJVcr\r\n" \
-"ra2F00aXCGkYVLvyvbZIq7LC+yVysej5gCeQYD7VFOEks0jhFjrS06gP0/XnWv6v\r\n" \
-"eBoPez9d+CCjkrhseiWzXOiriIMICX48EloO/DrsMRAtvlwq7EDz4QhILz6ffndm\r\n" \
-"e4K1cVANRPN2o9Y=\r\n" \
+"FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAC465FJh\r\n" \
+"Pqel7zJngHIHJrqj/wVAxGAFOTF396XKATGAp+HRCqJ81Ry60CNK1jDzk8dv6M6U\r\n" \
+"HoS7RIFiM/9rXQCbJfiPD5xMTejZp5n5UYHAmxsxDaazfA5FuBhkfokKK6jD4Eq9\r\n" \
+"1C94xGKb6X4/VkaPF7cqoBBw/bHxawXc0UEPjqayiBpCYU/rJoVZgLqFVP7Px3sv\r\n" \
+"a1nOrNx8rPPI1hJ+ZOg8maiPTxHZnBVLakSSLQy/sWeWyazO1RnrbxjrbgQtYKz0\r\n" \
+"e3nwGpu1w13vfckFmUSBhHXH7AAS/HpKC4IH7G2GAk3+n8iSSN71sZzpxonQwVbo\r\n" \
+"pMZqLmbBm/7WPLc=\r\n" \
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n"
const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256;
@@ -213,25 +213,26 @@ const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len = sizeof(
mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa );
/* tests/data_files/server2.crt */
#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1 \
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \
-"MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \
-"MA8GA1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \
-"MTEwMjEyMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjEwMjEyMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \
-"A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMTCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n" \
+"MIIDfTCCAmWgAwIBAgIBBDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \
+"MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \
+"MTkwMzEyMTAwNjA2WhcNMjkwMzEyMTAwNjA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \
+"A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n" \
"AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN\r\n" \
"owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz\r\n" \
"NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM\r\n" \
"tQCQ4dqCEGZ9rlQri2V5kaHiYcPNQEkI7mgM8YuG0ka/0LiqEQMef1aoGh5EGA8P\r\n" \
"hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya\r\n" \
-"HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYD\r\n" \
-"VR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgw\r\n" \
-"FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAJxnXClY\r\n" \
-"oHkbp70cqBrsGXLybA74czbO5RdLEgFs7rHVS9r+c293luS/KdliLScZqAzYVylw\r\n" \
-"UfRWvKMoWhHYKp3dEIS4xTXk6/5zXxhv9Rw8SGc8qn6vITHk1S1mPevtekgasY5Y\r\n" \
-"iWQuM3h4YVlRH3HHEMAD1TnAexfXHHDFQGe+Bd1iAbz1/sH9H8l4StwX6egvTK3M\r\n" \
-"wXRwkKkvjKaEDA9ATbZx0mI8LGsxSuCqe9r9dyjmttd47J1p1Rulz3CLzaRcVIuS\r\n" \
-"RRQfaD8neM9c1S/iJ/amTVqJxA1KOdOS5780WhPfSArA+g4qAmSjelc3p4wWpha8\r\n" \
-"zhuYwjVuX6JHG0c=\r\n" \
-"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n";
+"HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaOBkjCBjzAd\r\n" \
+"BgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwYwYDVR0jBFwwWoAUtFrkpbPe\r\n" \
+"0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f+hP6Q9MDsxCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREwDwYDVQQKDAhQb2xh\r\n" \
+"clNTTDEZMBcGA1UEAwwQUG9sYXJTU0wgVGVzdCBDQYIBAzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMA0G\r\n" \
+"CSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBAQBYbmGUE3tboOInTANuIf63NHlNGw0Zx79G9Oxv8gny\r\n" \
+"oBwzIg7LGeiuIeSJXGLZ6+MVR6vjCSm4lYVFbLmrk7DRRb+JlB/9knpAtMIzT4JB\r\n" \
+"x/eDnoI9/gNO8K8pLFmNkcXBdr/QxVR+Ao/kPWHoWQtxnzfyusZlbYNvFlchORCw\r\n" \
+"m1Wcvksm9LiIXDknugnXrAc2itXY1Iq8QmyFR/SXn3IMrn1LMlwgLOl6RccliBNm\r\n" \
+"YmyNC+pRJ047hjzMIgDT0FZH3eVgJ93b3ec4bxY1tPPlAAx1QwFGnXlt67QzsLCb\r\n" \
+"WBKL+sRYcWvNwEUnwbOii6N895YciSZUnzCo53uhJq6/\r\n" \
+"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n"
#if !defined(TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SOME)
const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1;
@@ -275,6 +276,7 @@ const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_len = sizeof(
mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa );
const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa[] = "PolarSSLTest";
const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa ) - 1;
+/* tests/data_files/server2.key */
const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[] =
"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"
"MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAwU2j3efNHdEE10lyuJmsDnjkOjxKzzoTFtBa5M2jAIin7h5r\r\n"
@@ -305,11 +307,12 @@ const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[] =
"-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n";
const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa );
+/* tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt */
const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n"
"MIIDhTCCAm2gAwIBAgIBBDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n"
"MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n"
-"MTcwNTA1MTMwNzU5WhcNMjcwNTA2MTMwNzU5WjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n"
+"MTkwMzEyMTAwNDAxWhcNMjkwMzEyMTAwNDAxWjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n"
"A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGjAYBgNVBAMMEVBvbGFyU1NMIENsaWVudCAyMIIBIjAN\r\n"
"BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyHTEzLn5tXnpRdkUYLB9u5Pyax6f\r\n"
"M60Nj4o8VmXl3ETZzGaFB9X4J7BKNdBjngpuG7fa8H6r7gwQk4ZJGDTzqCrSV/Uu\r\n"
@@ -319,13 +322,13 @@ const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[] =
"/DZrtenNLQNiTrM9AM+vdqBpVoNq0qjU51Bx5rU2BXcFbXvI5MT9TNUhXwIDAQAB\r\n"
"o4GSMIGPMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRxoQBzckAvVHZeM/xSj7zx3WtGITBjBgNVHSMEXDBa\r\n"
"gBS0WuSls97SUva51aaVD+s+vMf9/6E/pD0wOzELMAkGA1UEBhMCTkwxETAPBgNV\r\n"
-"BAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRkwFwYDVQQDDBBQb2xhclNTTCBUZXN0IENBggEAMAkGA1Ud\r\n"
-"EwQCMAAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAC7yO786NvcHpK8UovKIG9cB32oSQQom\r\n"
-"LoR0eHDRzdqEkoq7yGZufHFiRAAzbMqJfogRtxlrWAeB4y/jGaMBV25IbFOIcH2W\r\n"
-"iCEaMMbG+VQLKNvuC63kmw/Zewc9ThM6Pa1Hcy0axT0faf1B/U01j0FIcw/6mTfK\r\n"
-"D8w48OIwc1yr0JtutCVjig5DC0yznGMt32RyseOLcUe+lfq005v2PAiCozr5X8rE\r\n"
-"ofGZpiM2NqRPePgYy+Vc75Zk28xkRQq1ncprgQb3S4vTsZdScpM9hLf+eMlrgqlj\r\n"
-"c5PLSkXBeLE5+fedkyfTaLxxQlgCpuoOhKBm04/R1pWNzUHyqagjO9Q=\r\n"
+"BAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRkwFwYDVQQDDBBQb2xhclNTTCBUZXN0IENBggEDMAkGA1Ud\r\n"
+"EwQCMAAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAH78VDMNqHyxX1Tdss1Dcbx475Gei+OO\r\n"
+"Pv5Z4EPLg/0Y7YgBoXI+3lM17CVhT9w5epPaSYmxzthtK0QSuJaS6Jgt7eHaQITT\r\n"
+"3KXcMPqluwCy1ddr1IRYW9dXCFtgaRNJibpDuuAwf8T2tCSsY6EaYDoNgv2y6ogu\r\n"
+"rh5/q7ca7Q4ENv3H+xq1V77baDa0QZijdPQ+WR+NTKPU0D8mDKlWLNSCpuItQ4Tu\r\n"
+"AYzCCTosMTHlGQJ/7BkhqChH0MLTCIlUktVjY7z/4XfOWYVUMPdqUJWwfz6AgEXL\r\n"
+"wjAFhq2OPrmyY2u8mrcVqpArDukPi9hOX5jzJtJaQVf4srpOL8e4nYg=\r\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n";
const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa );
diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecdsa.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecdsa.c
index 3f2cf1d31f8..4f1ce8ad205 100644
--- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecdsa.c
+++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecdsa.c
@@ -72,9 +72,14 @@ cleanup:
* Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3)
* Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message)
*/
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
- const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
- int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
+static int ecdsa_sign_internal( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind )
{
int ret, key_tries, sign_tries, blind_tries;
mbedtls_ecp_point R;
@@ -101,7 +106,10 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
mbedtls_mpi *s,
key_tries = 0;
do
{
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( grp, &k, &R, f_rng, p_rng )
);
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &k, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, &R, &k, &grp->G,
+ f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( r, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
if( key_tries++ > 10 )
@@ -120,15 +128,20 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
mbedtls_mpi *s,
/*
* Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step,
* avoiding a potential timing leak.
+ *
+ * This loop does the same job as mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey() and it is
+ * replaced by a call to it in the mainline. This change is not
+ * necessary to backport the fix separating the blinding and ephemeral
+ * key generating RNGs, therefore the original code is kept.
*/
blind_tries = 0;
do
{
size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &t, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &t, n_size, f_rng_blind,
+ p_rng_blind ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &t, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits )
);
- /* See mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair() */
if( ++blind_tries > 30 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
}
@@ -160,15 +173,27 @@ cleanup:
return( ret );
}
+
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t blen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng )
+{
+ /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */
+ return( ecdsa_sign_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng,
+ f_rng, p_rng ) );
+}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
-/*
- * Deterministic signature wrapper
- */
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
- const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
+static int ecdsa_sign_det_internal( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
@@ -176,12 +201,16 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
mbedtls_mpi
size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_mpi h;
+ /* Variables for deterministic blinding fallback */
+ const char* blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT";
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind;
if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &h );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx );
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx_blind );
/* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
@@ -189,15 +218,71 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
mbedtls_mpi
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &rng_ctx, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
- ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
- mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx );
+ if( f_rng_blind != NULL )
+ ret = ecdsa_sign_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx,
+ f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind );
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a
+ * second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid
+ * reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the
+ * risk that they leak this way.
+ */
+
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &rng_ctx_blind, md_info,
+ data, 2 * grp_len );
+ ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( &rng_ctx_blind,
+ (const unsigned char*) blind_label,
+ strlen( blind_label ) );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /*
+ * Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and
+ * message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information
+ * through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL
+ * won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should
+ * be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed.
+ */
+ ret = ecdsa_sign_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx_blind );
+
+ }
cleanup:
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &h );
return( ret );
}
+
+/*
+ * Deterministic signature wrappers
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
+{
+ return( ecdsa_sign_det_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
+ NULL, NULL ) );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind )
+{
+ return( ecdsa_sign_det_internal( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
+ f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind ) );
+}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT)
@@ -328,17 +413,15 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
mbedtls_md_type_t
mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
- (void) f_rng;
- (void) p_rng;
-
- MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( &ctx->grp, &r, &s,
&ctx->d,
- hash, hlen, md_alg ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_det_internal( &ctx->grp, &r, &s,
&ctx->d,
+ hash, hlen, md_alg,
+ f_rng, p_rng ) );
#else
(void) md_alg;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s,
&ctx->d,
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) );
diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecjpake.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecjpake.c
index a205746aace..feaf4cb37ed 100644
--- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecjpake.c
+++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecjpake.c
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static int ecjpake_hash( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info,
p += id_len;
/* Compute hash */
- mbedtls_md( md_info, buf, p - buf, hash );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_md( md_info, buf, p - buf, hash ) );
/* Turn it into an integer mod n */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( h, hash,
@@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_pms[] = {
0xb4, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x19, 0xd3, 0xc4, 0xf3, 0x51
};
-/* Load my private keys and generate the correponding public keys */
+/* Load my private keys and generate the corresponding public keys */
static int ecjpake_test_load( mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *xm1, size_t len1,
const unsigned char *xm2, size_t len2 )
diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp.c
index 809c5f1a061..5d20db854dd 100644
--- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp.c
+++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ecp.c
@@ -1920,15 +1920,14 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const
mbedtls_mpi *
}
/*
- * Generate a keypair with configurable base point
+ * Generate a private key
*/
-int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
- const mbedtls_ecp_point *G,
- mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *d,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
@@ -1953,8 +1952,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 1, 0 ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 2, 0 ) );
}
- else
#endif /* ECP_MONTGOMERY */
+
#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS )
{
@@ -1988,15 +1987,28 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 ||
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 );
}
- else
#endif /* ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS */
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
cleanup:
- if( ret != 0 )
- return( ret );
+ return( ret );
+}
- return( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, Q, d, G, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+/*
+ * Generate a keypair with configurable base point
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *G,
+ mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng )
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, d, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, Q, d, G, f_rng, p_rng ) );
+
+cleanup:
+ return( ret );
}
/*
diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/error.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/error.c
index bc135a7ad8f..87536ec5acb 100644
--- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/error.c
+++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/error.c
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen )
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Destination buffer is too
small" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR) )
- mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - A fatal error occured, eg the
chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed" );
+ mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - A fatal error occurred, eg the
chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */
// END generated code
diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/havege.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/havege.c
index bd066e5c900..e767deedbdc 100644
--- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/havege.c
+++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/havege.c
@@ -39,8 +39,19 @@
#include "mbedtls/havege.h"
#include "mbedtls/timing.h"
+#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
+/* If int isn't capable of storing 2^32 distinct values, the code of this
+ * module may cause a processor trap or a miscalculation. If int is more
+ * than 32 bits, the code may not calculate the intended values. */
+#if INT_MIN + 1 != -0x7fffffff
+#error "The HAVEGE module requires int to be exactly 32 bits, with INT_MIN =
-2^31."
+#endif
+#if UINT_MAX != 0xffffffff
+#error "The HAVEGE module requires unsigned to be exactly 32 bits."
+#endif
+
/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */
static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
volatile unsigned char *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0;
@@ -60,7 +71,7 @@ static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
* ------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
-#define SWAP(X,Y) { int *T = X; X = Y; Y = T; }
+#define SWAP(X,Y) { unsigned *T = (X); (X) = (Y); (Y) = T; }
#define TST1_ENTER if( PTEST & 1 ) { PTEST ^= 3; PTEST >>= 1;
#define TST2_ENTER if( PTEST & 1 ) { PTEST ^= 3; PTEST >>= 1;
@@ -83,7 +94,7 @@ static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
PTX = (PT1 >> 18) & 7; \
PT1 &= 0x1FFF; \
PT2 &= 0x1FFF; \
- CLK = (int) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \
+ CLK = (unsigned) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \
\
i = 0; \
A = &WALK[PT1 ]; RES[i++] ^= *A; \
@@ -106,7 +117,7 @@ static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
\
IN = (*A >> (5)) ^ (*A << (27)) ^ CLK; \
*A = (*B >> (6)) ^ (*B << (26)) ^ CLK; \
- *B = IN; CLK = (int) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \
+ *B = IN; CLK = (unsigned) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \
*C = (*C >> (7)) ^ (*C << (25)) ^ CLK; \
*D = (*D >> (8)) ^ (*D << (24)) ^ CLK; \
\
@@ -157,19 +168,20 @@ static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
PT1 ^= (PT2 ^ 0x10) & 0x10; \
\
for( n++, i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) \
- hs->pool[n % MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE] ^= RES[i];
+ POOL[n % MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE] ^= RES[i];
/*
* Entropy gathering function
*/
static void havege_fill( mbedtls_havege_state *hs )
{
- int i, n = 0;
- int U1, U2, *A, *B, *C, *D;
- int PT1, PT2, *WALK, RES[16];
- int PTX, PTY, CLK, PTEST, IN;
+ unsigned i, n = 0;
+ unsigned U1, U2, *A, *B, *C, *D;
+ unsigned PT1, PT2, *WALK, *POOL, RES[16];
+ unsigned PTX, PTY, CLK, PTEST, IN;
- WALK = hs->WALK;
+ WALK = (unsigned *) hs->WALK;
+ POOL = (unsigned *) hs->pool;
PT1 = hs->PT1;
PT2 = hs->PT2;
diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.c
index 6adfef7e70d..9a4a1a880e9 100644
--- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.c
+++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.c
@@ -153,20 +153,32 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
}
/*
- * HMAC_DRBG reseeding: 10.1.2.4 (arabic) + 9.2 (Roman)
+ * Internal function used both for seeding and reseeding the DRBG.
+ * Comments starting with arabic numbers refer to section 10.1.2.4
+ * of SP800-90A, while roman numbers refer to section 9.2.
*/
-int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
- const unsigned char *additional, size_t len )
+static int hmac_drbg_reseed_core( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *additional, size_t len,
+ int use_nonce )
{
unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT];
- size_t seedlen;
+ size_t seedlen = 0;
int ret;
- /* III. Check input length */
- if( len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ||
- ctx->entropy_len + len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
{
- return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
+ size_t total_entropy_len;
+
+ if( use_nonce == 0 )
+ total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len;
+ else
+ total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len * 3 / 2;
+
+ /* III. Check input length */
+ if( len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ||
+ total_entropy_len + len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
+ }
}
memset( seed, 0, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT );
@@ -174,9 +186,32 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
/* IV. Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy for the seed */
if( ( ret = ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy,
seed, ctx->entropy_len ) ) != 0 )
+ {
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
+ }
+ seedlen += ctx->entropy_len;
+
+ /* For initial seeding, allow adding of nonce generated
+ * from the entropy source. See Sect 8.6.7 in SP800-90A. */
+ if( use_nonce )
+ {
+ /* Note: We don't merge the two calls to f_entropy() in order
+ * to avoid requesting too much entropy from f_entropy()
+ * at once. Specifically, if the underlying digest is not
+ * SHA-1, 3 / 2 * entropy_len is at least 36 Bytes, which
+ * is larger than the maximum of 32 Bytes that our own
+ * entropy source implementation can emit in a single
+ * call in configurations disabling SHA-512. */
+ if( ( ret = ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy,
+ seed + seedlen,
+ ctx->entropy_len / 2 ) ) != 0 )
+ {
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
+ }
+
+ seedlen += ctx->entropy_len / 2;
+ }
- seedlen = ctx->entropy_len;
/* 1. Concatenate entropy and additional data if any */
if( additional != NULL && len != 0 )
@@ -198,8 +233,20 @@ exit:
return( ret );
}
+/*
+ * HMAC_DRBG reseeding: 10.1.2.4 + 9.2
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *additional, size_t len )
+{
+ return( hmac_drbg_reseed_core( ctx, additional, len, 0 ) );
+}
+
/*
* HMAC_DRBG initialisation (10.1.2.3 + 9.1)
+ *
+ * The nonce is not passed as a separate parameter but extracted
+ * from the entropy source as suggested in 8.6.7.
*/
int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
const mbedtls_md_info_t * md_info,
@@ -209,7 +256,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
size_t len )
{
int ret;
- size_t entropy_len, md_size;
+ size_t md_size;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1 ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
@@ -237,20 +284,15 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
*
* (This also matches the sizes used in the NIST test vectors.)
*/
- entropy_len = md_size <= 20 ? 16 : /* 160-bits hash -> 128 bits */
- md_size <= 28 ? 24 : /* 224-bits hash -> 192 bits */
- 32; /* better (256+) -> 256 bits */
-
- /*
- * For initialisation, use more entropy to emulate a nonce
- * (Again, matches test vectors.)
- */
- ctx->entropy_len = entropy_len * 3 / 2;
+ ctx->entropy_len = md_size <= 20 ? 16 : /* 160-bits hash -> 128 bits */
+ md_size <= 28 ? 24 : /* 224-bits hash -> 192 bits */
+ 32; /* better (256+) -> 256 bits */
- if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( ctx, custom, len ) ) != 0 )
+ if( ( ret = hmac_drbg_reseed_core( ctx, custom, len,
+ 1 /* add nonce */ ) ) != 0 )
+ {
return( ret );
-
- ctx->entropy_len = entropy_len;
+ }
return( 0 );
}
diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/net_sockets.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/net_sockets.c
index 99348dc04fb..b7c66643188 100644
--- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/net_sockets.c
+++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/net_sockets.c
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static int net_would_block( const mbedtls_net_context *ctx )
int err = errno;
/*
- * Never return 'WOULD BLOCK' on a non-blocking socket
+ * Never return 'WOULD BLOCK' on a blocking socket
*/
if( ( fcntl( ctx->fd, F_GETFL ) & O_NONBLOCK ) != O_NONBLOCK )
{
diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/pkwrite.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/pkwrite.c
index 8e0bb2e605d..7cb7b9acad5 100644
--- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/pkwrite.c
+++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/pkwrite.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
@@ -56,6 +57,13 @@
#define mbedtls_free free
#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */
+static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
+ volatile unsigned char *p = (unsigned char*)v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
/*
* RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
@@ -145,6 +153,26 @@ static int pk_write_ec_param( unsigned char **p, unsigned char
*start,
return( (int) len );
}
+
+/*
+ * privateKey OCTET STRING -- always of length ceil(log2(n)/8)
+ */
+static int pk_write_ec_private( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec )
+{
+ int ret;
+ size_t byte_length = ( ec->grp.pbits + 7 ) / 8;
+ unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
+
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ec->d, tmp, byte_length );
+ if( ret != 0 )
+ goto exit;
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( p, start, tmp, byte_length );
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_zeroize( tmp, byte_length );
+ return( ret );
+}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
@@ -342,9 +370,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der( mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char
*buf, size_
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0
) );
len += par_len;
- /* privateKey: write as MPI then fix tag */
- MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( &c, buf, &ec->d )
);
- *c = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ /* privateKey */
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, pk_write_ec_private( &c, buf, ec ) );
/* version */
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int( &c, buf, 1 ) );
diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_srv.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_srv.c
index 388dd35ede5..ce2969bf015 100644
--- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_srv.c
+++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_srv.c
@@ -1457,7 +1457,7 @@ read_record_header:
*/
/*
- * Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions ommitted) is
+ * Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions omitted) is
* 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can
* read at least up to session id length without worrying.
*/
diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_tls.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_tls.c
index dde590af883..6f8566a9907 100644
--- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_tls.c
+++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/ssl_tls.c
@@ -2430,7 +2430,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t
nb_want )
}
/*
- * A record can't be split accross datagrams. If we need to read but
+ * A record can't be split across datagrams. If we need to read but
* are not at the beginning of a new record, the caller did something
* wrong.
*/
@@ -7741,8 +7741,12 @@ static int ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ssl_preset_suiteb_curves[] = {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1,
+#endif
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE
};
#endif
diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/timing.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/timing.c
index 9f9e98b413f..48eb83f8308 100644
--- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/timing.c
+++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/timing.c
@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
#include <windows.h>
-#include <winbase.h>
#include <process.h>
struct _hr_time
diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509.c
index 1d72bf49234..55007d38c03 100644
--- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509.c
+++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509.c
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char
*end,
}
/*
- * Parse an algorithm identifier with (optional) paramaters
+ * Parse an algorithm identifier with (optional) parameters
*/
int mbedtls_x509_get_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params )
diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509write_crt.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509write_crt.c
index a3aeeb5edcc..c9e4880c17e 100644
--- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509write_crt.c
+++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509write_crt.c
@@ -51,6 +51,16 @@ static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
volatile unsigned char *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0;
}
+/*
+ * For the currently used signature algorithms the buffer to store any signature
+ * must be at least of size MAX(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)
+ */
+#if MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN
+#else
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#endif
+
void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx )
{
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_cert ) );
@@ -340,7 +350,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der( mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned
char *buf,
size_t sig_oid_len = 0;
unsigned char *c, *c2;
unsigned char hash[64];
- unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char sig[SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char tmp_buf[2048];
size_t sub_len = 0, pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len;
size_t len = 0;
diff --git a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509write_csr.c b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509write_csr.c
index 394fa3f3fc8..3fd182b6a06 100644
--- a/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509write_csr.c
+++ b/dll/3rdparty/mbedtls/x509write_csr.c
@@ -50,6 +50,16 @@ static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
volatile unsigned char *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0;
}
+/*
+ * For the currently used signature algorithms the buffer to store any signature
+ * must be at least of size MAX(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)
+ */
+#if MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN
+#else
+#define SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#endif
+
void mbedtls_x509write_csr_init( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx )
{
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509write_csr ) );
@@ -165,7 +175,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned
char *buf, s
size_t sig_oid_len = 0;
unsigned char *c, *c2;
unsigned char hash[64];
- unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char sig[SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char tmp_buf[2048];
size_t pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len;
size_t len = 0;
diff --git a/media/doc/3rd Party Files.txt b/media/doc/3rd Party Files.txt
index 6b646c5092b..419672d3c3f 100644
--- a/media/doc/3rd Party Files.txt
+++ b/media/doc/3rd Party Files.txt
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ Used Version: 4.0.10
Website: http://www.simplesystems.org/libtiff/
Title: mbed TLS
-Used Version: 2.7.11
+Used Version: 2.7.12
Website: https://tls.mbed.org/
Title: libpng
diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/check_config.h
b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/check_config.h
index 564dd4ceb16..36927a90cb2 100644
--- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/check_config.h
+++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/check_config.h
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) && \
@@ -120,7 +120,8 @@
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) && \
- !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) ) )
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) ) )
#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
@@ -673,7 +674,7 @@
/*
* Avoid warning from -pedantic. This is a convenient place for this
* workaround since this is included by every single file before the
- * #if defined(MBEDTLS_xxx_C) that results in emtpy translation units.
+ * #if defined(MBEDTLS_xxx_C) that results in empty translation units.
*/
typedef int mbedtls_iso_c_forbids_empty_translation_units;
diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/config.h
b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/config.h
index e00456228db..050ca896dea 100644
--- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/config.h
+++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/config.h
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@
* \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE
*
* System has time.h and time(), gmtime() and the clock is correct.
- * The time needs to be correct (not necesarily very accurate, but at least
+ * The time needs to be correct (not necessarily very accurate, but at least
* the date should be correct). This is used to verify the validity period of
* X.509 certificates.
*
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@
* \note Because of a signature change, the core AES encryption and decryption routines
are
* currently named mbedtls_aes_internal_encrypt and mbedtls_aes_internal_decrypt,
* respectively. When setting up alternative implementations, these functions
should
- * be overriden, but the wrapper functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt and
mbedtls_aes_encrypt
+ * be overridden, but the wrapper functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt and
mbedtls_aes_encrypt
* must stay untouched.
*
* \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then is is recommended to also set
@@ -335,6 +335,16 @@
* dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests
* and ciphers instead.
*
+ * \warning If both MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC are
+ * enabled, then the deterministic ECDH signature functions pass the
+ * the static HMAC-DRBG as RNG to mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(). Therefore
+ * alternative implementations should use the RNG only for generating
+ * the ephemeral key and nothing else. If this is not possible, then
+ * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC should be disabled and an alternative
+ * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext()
+ * (and for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() too if backward compatibility is
+ * desirable).
+ *
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT
//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT
@@ -1394,7 +1404,7 @@
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
*
* Enable support for RFC 5077 session tickets in SSL.
- * Client-side, provides full support for session tickets (maintainance of a
+ * Client-side, provides full support for session tickets (maintenance of a
* session store remains the responsibility of the application, though).
* Server-side, you also need to provide callbacks for writing and parsing
* tickets, including authenticated encryption and key management. Example
@@ -1560,7 +1570,7 @@
*
* \warning TLS-level compression MAY REDUCE SECURITY! See for example the
* CRIME attack. Before enabling this option, you should examine with care if
- * CRIME or similar exploits may be a applicable to your use case.
+ * CRIME or similar exploits may be applicable to your use case.
*
* \note Currently compression can't be used with DTLS.
*
@@ -2756,7 +2766,7 @@
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME time /**< Default time to use, can be
undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF fprintf /**< Default fprintf to use, can
be undefined */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF printf /**< Default printf to use, can be
undefined */
-/* Note: your snprintf must correclty zero-terminate the buffer! */
+/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF snprintf /**< Default snprintf to use, can
be undefined */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS 0 /**< Default exit value to use,
can be undefined */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE 1 /**< Default exit value to use,
can be undefined */
@@ -2773,7 +2783,7 @@
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO time_t /**< Default time macro to
use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO fprintf /**< Default fprintf macro to
use, can be undefined */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO printf /**< Default printf macro to
use, can be undefined */
-/* Note: your snprintf must correclty zero-terminate the buffer! */
+/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO snprintf /**< Default snprintf macro to
use, can be undefined */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**<
Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write
/**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */
diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
index 9659bc07f20..80809dbed04 100644
--- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
+++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
@@ -109,6 +109,20 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
mbedtls_mpi *s,
* Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic
* Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)</em>.
*
+ *
+ * \warning Since the output of the internal RNG is always the same for
+ * the same key and message, this limits the efficiency of
+ * blinding and leaks information through side channels. For
+ * secure behavior use mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() instead.
+ *
+ * (Optimally the blinding is a random value that is different
+ * on every execution. In this case the blinding is still
+ * random from the attackers perspective, but is the same on
+ * each execution. This means that this blinding does not
+ * prevent attackers from recovering secrets by combining
+ * several measurement traces, but may prevent some attacks
+ * that exploit relationships between secret data.)
+ *
* \param grp The ECP group.
* \param r The first output integer.
* \param s The second output integer.
@@ -129,9 +143,56 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
mbedtls_mpi *s,
*
* \see ecp.h
*/
-int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
- const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
- mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
+/**
+ * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a
+ * previously-hashed message, deterministic version.
+ *
+ * For more information, see <em>RFC-6979: Deterministic
+ * Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic
+ * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)</em>.
+ *
+ * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the
+ * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as
+ * defined in <em>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group
+ * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em>, section
+ * 4.1.3, step 5.
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part
+ * the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part
+ * the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized
+ * and setup, for example through mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey().
+ * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
+ * \p blen is zero.
+ * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data.
+ * \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be
+ * \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX
+ * error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
/**
diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecp.h
b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecp.h
index adac0b2dc0a..fe1c9c23273 100644
--- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecp.h
+++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ecp.h
@@ -603,6 +603,22 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const
mbedtls_ecp_po
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_mpi *d );
+/**
+ * \brief Generate a private key
+ *
+ * \param grp ECP group
+ * \param d Destination MPI (secret part)
+ * \param f_rng RNG function
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful,
+ * or a MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng );
+
/**
* \brief Generate a keypair with configurable base point
*
diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h
b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h
index 71f6c358123..6085d476f09 100644
--- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h
+++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ extern "C" {
*/
typedef struct
{
- /* Working state: the key K is not stored explicitely,
+ /* Working state: the key K is not stored explicitly,
* but is implied by the HMAC context */
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; /*!< HMAC context (inc. K) */
unsigned char V[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; /*!< V in the spec */
diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/pk.h
b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/pk.h
index f9d7d28be2b..2377d0b27d7 100644
--- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/pk.h
+++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/pk.h
@@ -345,6 +345,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void
*options,
*
* \note For RSA, md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if hash_len != 0.
* For ECDSA, md_alg may never be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE.
+ *
+ * \note In order to ensure enough space for the signature, the
+ * \p sig buffer size must be of at least
+ * `max(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN, MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)` bytes.
*/
int mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/rsa.h
b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/rsa.h
index ef03290a223..22de6a370c9 100644
--- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/rsa.h
+++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/rsa.h
@@ -148,13 +148,13 @@ mbedtls_rsa_context;
* \note The choice of padding mode is strictly enforced for private key
* operations, since there might be security concerns in
* mixing padding modes. For public key operations it is
- * a default value, which can be overriden by calling specific
+ * a default value, which can be overridden by calling specific
* \c rsa_rsaes_xxx or \c rsa_rsassa_xxx functions.
*
* \note The hash selected in \p hash_id is always used for OEAP
* encryption. For PSS signatures, it is always used for
- * making signatures, but can be overriden for verifying them.
- * If set to #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it is always overriden.
+ * making signatures, but can be overridden for verifying them.
+ * If set to #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it is always overridden.
*/
void mbedtls_rsa_init( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int padding,
@@ -821,6 +821,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
*
* \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size
* of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used.
+ * A buffer length of #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe.
*
* \note For PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding, see comments on
* mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign() for details on
@@ -864,6 +865,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
*
* \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size
* of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used.
+ * A buffer length of #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe.
*/
int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
@@ -904,6 +906,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
*
* \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size
* of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used.
+ * A buffer length of #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe.
*
* \note The \p hash_id in the RSA context is the one used for the
* encoding. \p md_alg in the function call is the type of hash
diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl.h
b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl.h
index 5df693a51ca..4785c527e15 100644
--- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl.h
+++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -1609,7 +1609,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
* provision more than one cert/key pair (eg one ECDSA, one
* RSA with SHA-256, one RSA with SHA-1). An adequate
* certificate will be selected according to the client's
- * advertised capabilities. In case mutliple certificates are
+ * advertised capabilities. In case multiple certificates are
* adequate, preference is given to the one set by the first
* call to this function, then second, etc.
*
@@ -2614,7 +2614,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
* mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() or mbedtls_ssl_config_free().
*
* \note You need to call mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() unless you
- * manually set all of the relevent fields yourself.
+ * manually set all of the relevant fields yourself.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration context
*/
diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h
b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h
index ffdc49616d4..99d960331da 100644
--- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h
+++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h
@@ -119,14 +119,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx,
/**
* \brief Implementation of the ticket write callback
*
- * \note See \c mbedlts_ssl_ticket_write_t for description
+ * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t for description
*/
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write;
/**
* \brief Implementation of the ticket parse callback
*
- * \note See \c mbedlts_ssl_ticket_parse_t for description
+ * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t for description
*/
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse;
diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/version.h
b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/version.h
index 52a2e163410..9f5fc45335b 100644
--- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/version.h
+++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/version.h
@@ -42,16 +42,16 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 7
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 11
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 12
/**
* The single version number has the following structure:
* MMNNPP00
* Major version | Minor version | Patch version
*/
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02070B00
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.7.11"
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.7.11"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x02070C00
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.7.12"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.7.12"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)
diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509.h
b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509.h
index 0f0ef2eedff..ae8e25b819d 100644
--- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509.h
+++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509.h
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED -0x2880 /**< Allocation of
memory failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x2900 /**< Read/write of
file failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x2980 /**< Destination
buffer is too small. */
-#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR -0x3000 /**< A fatal error
occured, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR -0x3000 /**< A fatal error
occurred, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed. */
/* \} name */
/**
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const
mbedtls_x509_buf *se
*
* \param to mbedtls_x509_time to check
*
- * \return 1 if the given time is in the past or an error occured,
+ * \return 1 if the given time is in the past or an error occurred,
* 0 otherwise.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *to );
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *to );
*
* \param from mbedtls_x509_time to check
*
- * \return 1 if the given time is in the future or an error occured,
+ * \return 1 if the given time is in the future or an error occurred,
* 0 otherwise.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( const mbedtls_x509_time *from );
diff --git a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509_crl.h
b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509_crl.h
index 99f6e712696..b142e1e10bf 100644
--- a/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509_crl.h
+++ b/sdk/include/reactos/libs/mbedtls/x509_crl.h
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain,
/**
* \brief Parse one or more CRLs and append them to the chained list
*
- * \note Mutliple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format
+ * \note Multiple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format
*
* \param chain points to the start of the chain
* \param buf buffer holding the CRL data in PEM or DER format
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse( mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned
char *buf, s
/**
* \brief Load one or more CRLs and append them to the chained list
*
- * \note Mutliple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format
+ * \note Multiple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format
*
* \param chain points to the start of the chain
* \param path filename to read the CRLs from (in PEM or DER encoding)
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Thomas Faber